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Is it Time to Give Up on Antitrust Law
for Pro Sports?
By Geoffrey Rapp*
Abstract
Professor Nathaniel Grow has produced a creative,
thoroughly researched piece arguing that antitrust has failed in
the context of professional sports and calling for the creation of a
national-level federal regulatory agency to address anticompetitive
conduct by the major leagues. I respond to his diagnosis of
antitrust’s failings and to his prescription.
In his provocative new article, Professor Nathaniel Grow
calls for the creation of a federal regulatory body to oversee
America’s major sports leagues.1 His diagnosis: antitrust law has
failed to curb the exercise of monopoly power by the major sports
leagues, resulting in harm to the public, and the only feasible
solution is a federal regulatory entity.2
Grow’s conclusions are grounded on four propositions. First,
antitrust law has failed to regulate sports leagues.3 Baseball is
the most notable example, in that the courts have abdicated any
role as antitrust authorities for nearly a century,4 even as all
* Harold A. Anderson Professor of Law and Values and Associate Dean
for Academic Affairs, University of Toledo College of Law; Co-Editor, Sports
Law Blog.
1. Nathaniel Grow, Regulating Professional Sports Leagues, 72 WASH. &
LEE. L. REV. 573, 573 (2015).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 576.
4. See generally Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972) (finding that the
plaintiff baseball player could not bring an antitrust claim challenging the
sport’s reserve); Toolson v. New York Yankees, 346 U.S. 356 (1953) (refusing to
overrule dismissals of anti-trust lawsuits on the ground that the business of
providing public baseball games for profit between clubs of professional baseball
players was not within the scope of the federal antitrust laws); Fed. Baseball
Club of Baltimore v. Nat’l League of Prof’l Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200 (1922)
(finding baseball competitions not commerce, and thus purely a state affair and
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doctrinal foundation for the sport’s “antitrust exemption” has
been obliterated.5 Yet even in the context of three other major
sports—football, basketball, and hockey—Grow finds that
antitrust law has failed.
Second, as a result of their evasion of antitrust law’s
mandate for market competition, the major leagues operate in
ways that harm the public. Here, Grow concentrates on the
extraction of stadium subsidies6 from leagues that threaten to
move teams to other markets if their demands for lavish new
facilities are not met and the leagues’ failure to expand to new
cities.7 He also argues that collective broadcasting practices lead
to higher cable television bills and other results harmful to
consumers.8
Third, Grow argues that two prior proposals for addressing
these problems, divestiture (break-up of the dominant league into
two or more separate leagues)9 and a Euro-Soccer style promotion
and relegation regime,10 are inadequate. Divestiture, he argues,
is simply not going to happen; Congress lacks the political will,
and antitrust courts shun such draconian remedies in the modern
era. Moreover, he doubts the likelihood that a model of two
competing leagues would be sustainable because the leagues
would likely outbid one another for star players, to the point of
economic failure.11 Alternatively, to produce a single “world” or
“national” champion, two leagues would likely collaborate to the
point that they practically function as a single monopolist, for all
intents and purposes.12 Grow argues that promotion and
relegation are similarly unlikely to ever occur, could generate
public backlash, and ultimately would not reduce the monopoly

not subject to federal antitrust law).
5. See Jon M. Sands, The Baseball Trust: A History of Baseball’s Antitrust
Exemption, 61 FED. LAW. 121, 122 (2014) (reviewing STUART BANNER, THE
BASEBALL TRUST: A HISTORY OF BASEBALL’S ANTITRUST EXEMPTION (2013)).
6. Grow, supra note 1, at 607–08.
7. Id. at 610–11.
8. Id. at 577.
9. Id. at 629–30.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 631.
12. Id. at 633–34.
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power of a league, even as its “premiership” composition changed
from year to year.13
Fourth, Grow asserts that a new government agency—or
division within an existing agency—offers a workable solution. At
a minimum, that agency would have authority over: (1) expansion
and contraction, and (2) broadcast activities.14
I find Grow’s argument creative and well-supported, though I
am not entirely persuaded. Grow views the basis for courts’
unwillingness to apply antitrust law to sports leagues as a
product of the unique level of coordination required by sports
leagues.15 I have three concerns.
First, this view could be premature. Because sports league
antitrust cases are relatively rare16—they require, in most cases,
a work stoppage,17 a rival league,18 or a recalcitrant owner,19 and
13. See Grow, supra note 1, at 638 (“[C]onsidering the popularity of the
existing leagues, as well as the well-entrenched tradition of closed sports
leagues in the United States, the imposition of such a radical structural
change . . . would likely generate significant public backlash among many of the
nation’s sports fans.”).
14. Id. at 642.
15. See id. at 585–86 (arguing that it has “proven difficult to apply
coherently to the industry due to its unique economic characteristics”).
16. Sands, supra note 5, at 122.
17. A strike, or lockout, creates the potential for players to bring a lawsuit
that avoids the non-statutory labor exemption from antitrust, at least at some
point, such as when players decertify as a union. See Christopher Smith, A
Necessary Game Changer: Resolving the Legal Quagmire Surrounding
Expiration of the Nonstatutory Labor Exemption in Sports, 14 U. PA. J. BUS. L.
1191, 1192 (2012) (describing the legal rules surrounding when the exemption
ends after the expiration of a CBA as a “confusing mess”).
18. See Thane N. Rosenbaum, The Antitrust Implications of Professional
Sports Leagues Revisited: Emerging Trends in the Modern Era, 41 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 729, 814–15 (1987) (discussing concerns that can lead to antitrust claims
arising from the existence of a rival league). The start-up costs of creating a
rival even vaguely constituting a threat to a preeminent league are quite high.
See Mitchell Nathanson, What’s in a Name, or Better Yet, What’s it Worth?
Cities, Sports Teams and the Right of Publicity, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 167, 182
(2007) (“[S]tart-up costs for new leagues have skyrocketed to the point where
today there is little threat of new teams from rival leagues potentially entering
existing markets.”). But see Rosenbaum, infra note 20, at 798 n.280 (explaining
why there are not actually observable entry barriers for rival leagues).
19. The classic example is Oakland Raiders owner Al Davis. See Matthew
J. Mitten & Bruce W. Barton, Professional Sports Franchise Relocations from
Private Law and Public Law Perspectives: Balancing Marketplace Competition,
League Autonomy, and the Need for a Level Playing Field, 56 MD. L. REV. 57, 104
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only in even rarer cases are they decided on the merits20—sports
league antitrust jurisprudence has undoubtedly evolved at a
glacial pace. Yet, it might be possible that in some future dispute,
courts could start getting things right. If one had written on the
courts’ treatment of the NCAA a decade ago, surely one could
have concluded, as Grow does in the professional context, that the
NCAA had evaded antitrust scrutiny in the courts.21 But today,
we have Keller22 and O’Bannon23 radically shifting the college
sports antitrust framework. These cases could be a preview of a
professional sports dispute of the future—one that may be
unlikely given the leagues’ ability to buy out any challengers,
internal or otherwise, but one that could nonetheless demand
different thinking on antitrust’s potential to regulate sports.
Second, the landscape Grow surveys to conclude that sports
have effectively become natural monopolies24 consists largely of
cases in which sports leagues faced minimal competition. Rival
leagues failed on their own, often due to poor business models, so
there was little the courts could do using antitrust decisions to
free the forces of competition in professional sports.25
(1997) (“Most league attempts to block franchise relocations were directed at
owners, such as Charlie Finley, Bill Veeck, and Al Davis, who were perceived as
mavericks. Apparently, ‘personal animosity’ and other factors motivated these
actions, rather than an honest desire to protect a host city’s interests.”).
20. Michael A. Carrier & Christopher L. Sagers, O’Bannon v. National
Collegiate Athletic Association: Why the Ninth Circuit Should Not Block the
Floodgates of Change in College Athletics, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 299,
300 (2015) (explaining how O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7 F.
Supp. 3d 955 (N.D. Cal. 2014), stands as a rare antitrust case because the ruleof-reason challenge actually reached the merits).
21. In fact, some wrote exactly that. For instance, one author argued that
“judicial deference to the NCAA” was “insurmountable to parties raising
antitrust claims.” Gordon E. Gouveia, Making a Mountain out of a Mogul:
Jeremy Bloom v. NCAA and Unjustified Denial of Compensation Under NCAA
Amateurism Rules, 6 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 22, 27 (2003). Another wrote that
courts “have been unwilling to entertain antitrust disputes involving the NCAA,
in effect granting a private organization carte blanche authority over
substantial commerce.” Lisa M. Bianchi & Bryan S. Gadol, Casenote, When
Playing the Game of College Sports, You Should Not Be Playing “Monopoly”, 1
CHAP. L. REV. 151, 169 (1998).
22. In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., 724
F.3d 1268 (9th Cir. 2013).
23. Id.
24. Grow, supra note 1, at 639.
25. Famously, although the USFL “won” its antitrust challenge against the
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But what if a real competitor emerged? Grow doubts this
possibility,26 but two prospects come to mind. The first, and more
likely option, is a foreign or global league seeking to penetrate
U.S. markets,27 perhaps in hockey or basketball. Such a league
might possess the financial resources necessary to litigate
antitrust claims in ways the XFL28 never could. Second, a
prolonged work stoppage might lead star players to break from
their leagues and start new ventures using a cooperative business
form: a player-owned league—a model pioneered, with some
success, by the case of Professional Bull Riding (PBR).29 Either a
well-funded foreign league or the “Brady-Manning Football
League” could have the resources to both compete effectively and
use the levers of antitrust against the current dominant leagues.
In other words, Grow’s analysis may well be in reaction to a lack
of plaintiffs with standing and injury to date, rather than actual
failures by antitrust courts.
Third, Grow’s case for antitrust’s failings is based on decades
of sports law cases from the pre-digital era. With the advent of
streaming and other new ways of accessing sports broadcasts, the
possibility of intra-league competition becomes more of a reality.
Traditionally, teams competed on the field but not for fans;
allegiances were divided by geography and perpetuated by
limited access to televised performances of other teams. Today, a
consumer can choose many different modes of fandom, and these
new channels open possibilities for antitrust violations—and
successful vindication of such claims in the courts—that have not
NFL, it was awarded only one dollar in damages, suggesting that the jury
“conclude[ed] that the USFL’s product was not appealing largely for reasons of
the USFL’s own doing.” United States Football League v. Nat’l Football League,
842 F.2d 1335, 1342 (2d Cir. 1988).
26. Grow, supra note 1, at 639.
27. See Marc Edelman, Does the NBA Still Have “Market Power”?
Exploring the Antitrust Implications of an Increasingly Global Market for Men’s
Basketball Player Labor, 41 RUTGERS L. J. 549, 576–80 (2010) (discussing the
rise of global basketball).
28. Maxwell J. Mehlman et al., Doping in Sports and the Use of State
Power, 50 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 15, 49 (2005) (“Distastefulness certainly can kill a
sport; witness what happened to XFL football.”).
29. PBR was founded in 1992 by twenty bull riders who “broke away from
the
traditional
rodeo
scene.”
History,
PROF.
BULL
RIDERS,
http://www.pbr.com/en/education/history.aspx (last visited Aug. 5, 2015) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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been open for most of the formative years of sports antitrust
jurisprudence.
I am also not entirely persuaded that sports leagues use their
monopoly power in ways that are as harmful to the public as
Grow posits. Ordinarily, the harm to the public arising from
monopolies consists of supra-competitive pricing. In their direct
dealings with the public, the sports leagues often appear to price
at sub-competitive levels.30 “Scalping” would not be profitable if
tickets to ordinary sporting events were priced at the level
predicted by consumer demand. Recognizing that any extraction
of rent from the public is indirect, Grow concentrates on three
harms flowing from the leagues’ status as unregulated
monopolies: (1) inadequate expansion (“artificial scarcity”);31 (2)
extraction of public subsidies in connection with stadium
construction and renovation;32 and (3) broadcasting practices.33
Among the problems here is determining the “optimal” level
of expansion. As Grow recognizes, at some point, expanding a
league risks diluting talent levels in ways fans might not want.34
The extraction of stadium subsidies is indeed distressing, but it
might be more of a political failing than a legal one. Perhaps local
governments, or all forms of government, simply cannot be
trusted to make rational, long-term decisions when it comes to
sports. This, however, should give one pause about Grow’s
proposed solution: governmental regulation. If countless counties
and cities are unable to stand up to sports leagues, why should
we expect a new regulatory agency to be anything other than a
quick and easy captive?35
30. See Scott D. Simon, Note, If You Can’t Beat ‘Em, Join ‘Em: Implications
for New York’s Scalping Law in Light of Recent Developments in the Ticket
Business, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 1171, 1176 (2004) (“Traditionally, the
entertainment and sports industries have set their ticket prices far below
market value.”).
31. Grow, supra note 1, at 606.
32. Id. at 607.
33. Id. at 614–18.
34. Id. at 612–13.
35. New agencies face an “ever-present [risk] from vested interests of
regulatory capture in the framing of their legislation (Carve-outs or exceptions
for economically and politically influential sectors) or in the efficacy of their
enforcement efforts.” Michael J. Trebilcock & Edward M. Iacobucci, Designing
Competition Law Institutions: Values, Structure, and Mandate, 41 LOY. U. CHI.
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Arguing that sports monopolies produce higher cable bills,36
Grow is no doubt correct in his proposition that sports contracts
consume a huge share of cable providers’ outlays.37 But that does
not mean that the prices charged to cable providers—and passed
on to consumers—are necessarily supra competitive.38 Cable
providers, after all, operate in many markets as monopolies, or
close to it. In the battle of a sports league monopoly and a cable
monopoly, why should the sports league always win?
Grow recognizes that he is not the first to call for
governmental intervention, but he is the first to advance the case
in a thoughtful and detailed way in the last thirty-five years.
When contemplating his proposed agency, one wonders what
models he has in mind—the ICC or the FTC? How would the
agency avoid the kind of regulatory capture that besets the
federal bureaucracy? Would constitutional limitations on federal
power make the agency less effective than Grow imagines it
would be? And of course, like the alternatives of divestiture and
promotion/relegation, is there any realistic prospect that this
proposal is more than a thought experiment? In future work,
perhaps Grow will consider drafting the implementing legislation
that would create such an agency and giving a hypothetical
example of a proposed rule the agency might draft.
I enjoyed reading Professor Grow’s article; it provides fodder
for the active reimaging of American sports law, even if his
suggestion is about as likely to be adopted as the Chicago Cubs
are to win the World Series.39

L.J. 455, 470 (2010).
36. Grow, supra note 1, at 616.
37. Id.
38. See Holly Phillips, I Want My MTV, but Not Your VH1: A La Carte
Cable, Bundling, and the Potential Great Cable Compromise, 28 J. NAT’L ASS’N
ADMIN L. JUD. 321, 323–24 (2008) (arguing that “there is more competition than
ever before” between cable networks).
39. See Michael S. Melbinger, CCH EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION, Delaware
Courts Approve Another Lawsuit Over Director Stock Awards, 11 EXECUTIVE
COMPENSATION UPDATE, 2015 WL 3750353 (June 17, 2015) (“It is reasonably
conceivable that the Chicago Cubs will win the World Series this year (after a
106-year drought). Not likely, but reasonably conceivable.”).

